






PLAYING THE ‘GAME’ OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 








Maastricht, 6211 AX, Limburg 
Netherlands 
Tel: 031 43 388 44 00 
janyl.moldalieva@maastrichtuniversity.nl (corresponding author) 
 
JOHN HEATHERSHAW 
University of Exeter 
Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4RJ 
United Kingdom 




Word Count: 8537 (without abstract, references, title page) 
 
 
This work was supported by the United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and 







Playing the ‘Game’ of Transparency and Accountability: Non-elite Politics in 
Kyrgyzstan’s Natural Resource Governance 
 
Abstract 
This article demonstrates the role of non-elites in the struggle for transparency and 
accountability in Kyrgyzstan’s mining sector. Most existing accounts foreground elite 
strategies and political machines in the governance of post-Soviet societies. Drawing on 
recent anthropological work on post-Soviet politics and applying it critically to the literature 
on neopatrimonialism, this article sheds light on the adoption of political game strategies by 
community members (non-elites) to advance their interests and challenge elite dominance 
within the case study mining communities. This finding responds to recent calls to 
interrogate the activities of non-elites at the margins of neopatrimonial contexts. The article 
advances a research agenda on how practices by non-elites shape the multiple meanings and 
enactments of transparency and accountability by elites in natural resource governance. It 
also points to the need to explore how and why “communities” exert their “agency” in 
governing natural resources within post-Soviet contexts. 
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Introduction 
What happens to putatively liberal practices and institutions when they are enacted in largely 
illiberal contexts? This article examines how transparency and accountability (TA) work in 
contexts where resources are governed by informal patronage relations and elite-enforced 
formal rules (often labelled neopatrimonial, patronal or simply authoritarian). It sheds light 
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on the adoption of political game strategies by community members (non-elites) to advance 
their interests, both personal and collective. Dominant narratives of Central Asian politics 
have mainly discussed elite strategies and central state institutions in the governance of their 
societies (Collins 2006; Ilkhamov 2007; Luong 2002; McGlinchey 2009; Radnitz 2010; 
Wilson 2005). This top-down discourse on post-Soviet politics could lead one to view TA as 
(1) a series of institutions deployed instrumentally by elites to strengthen their political 
machines and systematize their power, and/or (2) superficially ‘symbolic’ in that TA cannot 
possibly work in an environment characterized by informal patronage and elite-enforced 
formal rules. This article takes a different perspective in addressing non-elites and the 
margins of politics. With a growing body of research on Central Asia, we argue that non-
elites articulate community interests and exert agency in neopatrimonial contexts (Wooden & 
Stefes 2009; Sanghera & Satybaldieva 2012; Doolot & Heathershaw 2015; Gulette & 
Heathershaw 2015; Ismailbekova 2017; Spector 2017; Furstenberg 2015). 
We pose the questions: How do local communities (non-elites) resist elite dominance 
within Kyrgyzstan’s resource governance space? What strategies do they use to engage in 
natural resource governance? What are their implications for transparent and accountable 
natural resource governance?  Guided by new research on neopatrimonialism and non-elite 
agency, this article proposes two hypotheses for consideration. First, citizen engagement in 
natural resource governance takes place at the intersection of formal and informal 
institutions, and between public and hidden spaces, whereby TA (might) emerge in the 
shadow of neopatrimonialism. Second, non-elites rework political space for their 
engagement in natural resource governance through utilizing opportunity structures and 
developing networked relations with other governance actors. The article explores these 
hypotheses empirically in an attempt to address the aforementioned questions. We argue that 
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non-elite agency is present both where TA are being used instrumentally in ‘virtual politics’ by 
local actors (Wilson 2005), and where TA goods are pursued substantively by non-elites against 
their putative patrons. TA norms are therefore not themselves prime values of politics but 
reflective of the patterns of contestations between elites and non-elites.  
This article is based on ethnographic and interview data collected for the first 
author’s doctoral research in 2015-2016 in Kyrgyzstan among 50 participants from 
government, civil society organizations, mining companies, independent experts and 
community members. The field research was conducted in Bishkek and two mining sites – 
Aral and Orlovka. Communities were selected based on the hybrid criteria of “most similar” 
and “most different” cases (see Teune and Przeworski 1970). We selected a set of unique 
cases that would help extend conceptual considerations and serve as empirical grounds for 
understanding the phenomena under investigation (TA in natural resource governance). 
Access to the study settings and participants were considered in selecting communities to 
ensure possibility of data collection. Two communities – Orlovka and Aral – both under the 
jurisdiction of different local self-governments (LSGs) were studied in this dissertation. 
Orlovka is a town of rayon significance1, and is located 120 km east of the country’s capital 
city – Bishkek, whereas Aral is a village, located 260 km from Bishkek. These study areas 
have the history of community protests and are primarily considered as gold-mining sites 
(with availability of other mineral resources), but at different stages of mining. 
Three Generations in the Study of Post-Soviet Politics 
Comprehensive study of Kyrgyzstan’s natural resource governance requires situating the case 
within the context of the country’s political regime. Political regime refers to “rules and basic 
                                                        
1 According to the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic #168 from 27 September 2012 “About 
Transforming Individual Urban-type Settlements of the Kyrgyz Republic and Categorizing 
them as Village or City”, Orlovka became a city of rayon significance. 
 
 5 
political resource allocations according to which actors exercise authority by imposing and 
enforcing collective decisions on a bounded constituency” (Kitschelt 1992, 1030). TA are 
discursive, institutional and practical products of political relations. Our understanding of 
TA in Central Asia is therefore derivative of our understanding of politics and political 
regimes in Central Asia, a sub-region which constitutes one stream of a wider post-Soviet 
delta.  In short, Central Asia remains resolutely post-Soviet despite the ebb and flow of its 
flow fully 30 years after the fall of the USSR. Therefore, any analysis of TA in Central Asia 
must engage with the analytical framework of post-Soviet politics. 
In the post-Soviet region certain periods or generations of analysis may be observed.  
An initial focus on transition in 1990s was succeeded in the 2000s by attention to hybrid 
regimes and neopatrimonialism and new interest in older concepts of authoritarianism and 
kleptocracy (Dawisha 2014; Hale 2014). Famously, in the first generation, transition theory, 
following O’Donnell et al. (1986), politics was assessed according to three precepts: the 
extent to which (1) formal institutions, conformed to the (2) standard of liberal democracy, 
at (3) the national scale. In the second generation of hybrid regimes and neopatrimonialism 
(Ledeneva 2006; Levitsky & Way 2010), the assessment shifted to (1) combinations of 
formal and informal institutions2, comprising (2) democratic and authoritarian features, at (3) 
the national scale. Thus, while the first two precepts of the so-called transition paradigm 
were challenged in political science the third precept was not.   
 For Central Asia too, this ‘second generation’ of post-Soviet analysis has set the 
terms of the debate for more than a decade. Scholars of Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, 
characterize political regimes in the region as being shaped by co-existing informal and 
                                                        
2 The reference to informal institutions in the existing literature includes practices such as 
patronage, vote rigging and selective application of formal rules, and informal organizations 
such as factional networks (Ilkhamov, 2007; Isaacs, 2010). 
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formal rules, elite power, personalized relations and patronage networks, often referred to as 
neopatrimonialism or patronal politics (Collins 2009; Cummings 2004; Ilkhamov 2007; 
Ishiyama 2002; Laruelle 2012; Lewis 2012; Luong 2002; Radnitz, 2010). Neopatrimonialism 
alludes to the rule of a person rather than an office (see Weber 1968), and is enforced 
through personal patronage, not through ideology or law (Bratton & Van de Walle 1994). 
Informal relations of loyalty and dependence pervade the formal political administrative 
system (Clapham 1985; Eisenstadt 1972; Snyder 1992). Although such a political system 
evolves around personalized relationships inside and outside the realm of politics and the 
state, it does not exclude informal collective behavior to “rally around some impersonalistic 
cause” (Hale 2014, 20; Laruelle 2012, 310).  
Such regional studies index the wider debates of the discipline of political science 
and the neo-institutional economics which has served as the principle intellectual context for 
its development. The study of politics has thereby concentrated on ‘mighty actors’ – i.e. 
elites’ appropriation of rents and manipulation in resource distribution (Acemoglu et al 2005; 
Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; North et al 2009) – and national politics (Arellano-Yanguas 
2008; Moore 2004; Newell & Wheeler 2006), which revolved around the agency of elites as 
holders of crucial resources (Hunter 1953; Mills 1956). In Central Asia, although power is 
highly personalized to a single political entity or multiple elites (see Ishiyama 2004), no single 
actor, even elites/patrons, is powerful on his/her own but must build and manage pyramids 
or networks of power (see Hale 2014; McGlinchey 2009). Radnitz (2010), working clearly 
within this second generation of research and connoting Hale (2005), argued that ‘subversive 
clientelism’ may emerge from within the regime and such counter-hegemonic elites may 
mobilise opposition to the national elites from the margins. Based on this spatio-hierarchical 
analysis of power, the political regime in Kyrgyzstan approximates to a neopatrimonial 
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regime with some degree of competition among elites, but still based on the rule of “big 
man” (Ishiyama 2004, 46-47). Kyrgyzstan’s status as a hybrid regime is, by this 
understanding, due to its smaller, more fragmented distribution of wealth among competing 
elites (Laruelle 2012, 311). Moreover, elites are defined as relevant due to their formal and 
informal power in the national context. 
These second-generation studies advanced considerably the study of politics in the 
Post-Soviet and Central Asian regions by drawing attention to the informal, the 
neopatrimonial and the authoritarian and how these elements may intertwine with formally 
democratic constitutions. While the earlier work on informal institutions in Central Asia 
focused on clans (see Collins 2006), scholars consider contemporary politics to be rather 
driven by economic interests, “influence groups” (Isaacs 2010) and elite networks, which 
were established across tribal and clan identities (Radnitz 2010). The significance of informal 
institutions was highlighted in a number of instances related, but not limited to negotiations 
and elites’ attempts to buy off public support (Budds and Hinojosa 2012; Engvall 2015; 
Laruelle 2012; Markowitz 2013). However, despite these considerable contributions, the 
limitations of these approaches are found in that third element of first-generation transition 
scholarship which remains unchallenged by the second: the fixation with the national level of 
analysis and, by extension, state elites. Perhaps as a by-product of methodological 
nationalism, political scientists’ spatial imaginary remained caught in the ‘territorial trap’ 
(Agnew 1994, Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). According to this precept, the politics that 
matters is that of the central state and political regime with sovereignty accruing to this state 
and society too demarcated by the boundaries of the national.  Even research which begins 
at the margins is ultimately forced to come back to the centre to say something about the 
politics of the top. The exclusion of non-elites and the failure to account for non-national 
 
 8 
actors’ interaction in elite model of power has long been challenged in democratic theory 
(see Dahl 1958; Wendt 1987) but is rarely considered in the empirical research of Political 
Science, especially in neopatrimonial and authoritarian contexts. 
The putative third generation of analysis is made distinctive by new theoretical 
moves on the third dimension – that of space.  This article embarks from the premise that 
this focus on the nation-state is increasingly difficult to justify in a context in which material 
and symbolic linkages between the global and local are more common and the speed of the 
interactions along these vectors are accelerated. It is not that the state disappears in this 
global context but that it is not always the arbiter of the flows, goods and norms from one 
place to the next, either across its borders or within them. New spaces emerge as conduits 
for political interaction and objects of contestation.  A great deal of this work has been led 
by anthropologists and/or the product of political ethnography. What this work shares is a 
refusal to frame the political in terms of the central political regime; rather politics is found, 
and remains, at the margins. These margins include Reeves’ (2005) Ferghana Valley borders, 
Beyer’s (2016) Kyrgyz customary law, Liu’s (2015) urban governance in Osh, Ismailbekova’s 
(2017) local politics, and Reeves et al. (2014) on inherently ambiguous state performances. 
But this marginal politics which lies beyond centred state space is not merely local. The 
margins of politics may also be transnational and include offshore companies and 
extraterritorial jurisdictions (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017), spaces of migration (Reeves 
2012), moral economies opposing neoliberalism (Sanghera and Satybaldieva 2012; Spector 
2017), and social movements against extractive industries (Doolotkeldieva 2015; Wooden 
2013). As Spector (2017) notes, in her study of Kyrgyzstan, growing economic and political 
importance of the bazaar may be understood ‘as confirmation of a global trend in which 
individuals increasingly rely on themselves as governments have become discredited as social 
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welfare providers’ (2, 31) None of these works makes their object of analysis the political 
regime; each analyses politics spatially from the local and transnational margins of the state.   
3. Political Game Strategies: Non-elite Agency  
We build on both the second and third generations of political analysis of post-Soviet 
Central Asia to inform a theoretical approach to non-elite agency. While Radnitz (2010) 
remains focused on elites in his study on mobilization, Wooden (2013), nodding to the third 
generation, urges researchers to study the role of non-elites in post-Soviet countries. A 
hierarchy is presumed here but may also be questioned. Political games involve both elites 
(often denoted as patrons) and non-elites (clients). “Patronage relations both manipulate and 
exploit other forms of social organization and values,” Ismailbekova (2017) notes, “but both 
patrons and clients actively participate in this manipulation, conspiring to somehow render 
the relationship a moral one” (3). Critical theorists like Cindi Katz (1996) also call attention 
to “minor politics”, especially in theorizing everyday political struggles. Minor politics, here, 
simply refers to the political practice of refusal by ‘oppressed’ minor groups (e.g. the 
marginalized in society) to the rule and logics of elites that precipitates crises and thus social 
transformations (see Deleuze and Guattari 1986; Katz 1996; Van Wezemael 2008). In other 
words, there is a need to pay attention to non-elite community practices that could (or is) 
potentially transform(ing) the nature of TA in natural resource governance.  
In the case study communities, non-elite practices evolved through engagement in 
political games where non-elite and non-national actors compete alongside elites. Political 
games occur when social interactions are driven by conflicting and/or competing interests 
and in the context of resource limitations (Smith 1965). Actors have different levels of access 
to resources. There is a particular sponsor who controls the game and determines the 
available strategies and the payoffs (Bagnoli and McKee 1991, 244). In neopatrimonial 
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settings, it is often the elites, as patrons, who are the sponsors of these games. However, 
both elites and non-elites could initiate political games within and outside of the formal 
government arena, depending on the relative payoffs of the respective games and their 
positions in them (see Smith 1965). It is predominantly assumed that political games are 
driven by motivations to gain power. However, Downs (1957) argues that actors might be 
interested in payoffs (other than power) such as money and social prestige.  
Another factor that animates political game is competition among localities (Cox and 
Mair 1988). The literature has long indicated that competition over the resources themselves 
is a primary cause of contestations in natural resource governance (Bulte and Damania 2008; 
Luong and Weinthal 2001; Mehlum et al. 2006). The dynamics of local development may 
threaten authority and power of local baymanaps [rich men] and hence they are more likely to 
fight against changing their ‘habitat’. This would elicit opposition of other players who strive 
to gain access to resources in order to change the status quo. Nonetheless, every actor within 
the community, whether capitalist firms, politicians or people, are dependent on each other 
in reproducing certain social relations within a particular space (Cox and Mair 1988). Actors 
often use each other’s economic interdependence to gain political influence over one 
another (Wagner 1998). They can adopt different strategies that shape their behavior and 
actions in political games (Suny 1999, 139). The most intriguing component of political 
games is a strategy (Smith, 1965). Translation of actors’ ideas into actions is heavily 
dependent on strategies. Studying actors and their strategies helps us understand political 
games in resource governance and their implications for TA (see Saurugger 2013). 
Drawing on this literature, the politics of natural resource governance in 
neopatrimonial settings may be assessed in terms of three strategies of the political game. 
The first strategy of non-elites with respect to elites is to reproduce the discourse of the elite, 
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thereby acknowledging the patron. It is a central strategy of elites to seek this affirmation of 
their authority from clients. James Scott (1990) classically identified this affirmation as the 
‘public transcript’ under which may lie a ‘hidden transcript’ of dissent. Agency lies not 
merely in the hidden transcript but in the minor politics of resigning to authority in the 
public transcript (Heathershaw 2009, 12, 60). TA are no less a domain of this minor politics 
of public and hidden transcripts than any other field or normative and material contestation. 
Officials in Kyrgyzstan adopt the logic of TA to ensure their political survival and maintain 
the existing political regime. They stimulate such change instrumentally through producing 
formally “symbolic” 3  or “virtual” moments (i.e. inviting other actors to govern) and 
informally, maintaining neopatrimonial ties by selectively employing TA to enhance their 
interests (Wilson 2005). But to assume that these moves and their associated discourse are 
wholly under the command of elites would be a mistake. Ismailbekova (2017) goes so far as 
identifying democracy in these moments, as a patron is required to gain the consent of 
clients through the provision of goods to clients and adherence to the moral logic of 
patronage. Most political scientists would resist the merger of neopatrimonial and 
democratic authority, but we may learn from ethnographic research by recognizing that these 
strategies are reciprocal and prone to manipulation by both elites and non-elites. 
The literature on neopatrimonial politics in a post-Soviet Eurasia identifies a second 
strategy: that patrons (and clients) create networks, mostly hierarchical, through which 
resources are distributed and coercion is applied (Hale 2014. They create opportunities in 
exchange for various forms of loyalty (Laruelle 2012). In such networks, personalized reach 
tends to stretch out to include individuals in a wide variety of other institutions – equals and 
                                                        
3 Edelman (1985) introduces symbolic nature of participation, arguing that politics determine 
what people desire, fear and consider possible. The use of symbolic here does not mean 
purely simulated.  
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some lower-level actors who have ties to multiple actors within the same network (Hale 
2014, 21-24). Through these networks, actors play political games to control resources (see 
Kohli 2004; Green 2010; Berman 1998). In natural resource governance, the state and 
licensed companies position themselves as legitimate actors that have rights to access and 
use resources through these networks, creating hierarchies, keeping gates and brokering 
resources. State patrons consider that they have the sole authority to set or change rules. 
However, as fieldwork data shows, non-elites may contest this authority.  
Third, patrons launch social mobilization to pursue their interests and respond to 
competition among patronage networks through taking advantage of the system that is 
muddled in between formal and informal rules (Medard 2002; Gazibo 2012; Braton and Van 
de Walle 1994; Snyder 1992). In this article, social mobilization towards TA refers to a 
process of collective action towards social change (Jenkins 1983, 532). In neopatrimonialism, 
protests would be considered as the strategy of elites; however, Wooden & Stefes (2009) 
refer to them as a new bottom-up political culture that emerged in Kyrgyzstan – “where 
political change is achieved not through polls and the ballot box, but through protests and 
bullhorns” (254; see also McGlinchey 2009). The limited research on social mobilization in 
Kyrgyzstan argues that elites and non-elites adopt social mobilization and networking 
strategies to contest power-holders (Wooden 2013; Doolotkeldieva 2015; Ismailbekova 
2017; Radnitz 2010).  
The remainder of the article now turns to empirical research on the use of these 
three political game strategies – publicly acknowledging the patron (in section 3); establishing 
non-elite networks (in 4) and launching social mobilization (in 5) – before a section of 
comparison between the cases where we discuss the variety of non-elite agency and its place 
in both epiphenomenal and substantive practices of TA. 
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3. Official Transparency and Accountability: Acknowledging the Patron 
Fieldwork data provides descriptions of how the patron is acknowledged in official TA 
activities associated with natural resources in Kyrgyzstan. An interview with a deputy of 
jergiliktuu kenesh [local legislative body/local council] in Orlovka, as captured in the quotation 
below, shows the use of TA logic such as public meetings and disclosure of information by a 
local (executive) government, but for sharing limited information: 
The LSG head would invite us to a meeting to share news about the funds received 
from the mining company. But he would not share the detailed expenditure budget, 
saying that our questioning was considered as interference into local government’s 
administrative work. Besides, the LSG head would conduct most of the meetings 
with the mining company himself behind the closed doors (LC Interview #1, 
September 2016).  
TA in this practice are very limited, almost virtual, and mediated by elites. The ‘patron’ 
acknowledged is not merely the local official, but this person is part of a network which 
includes the foreign mining company; the non-elite’s suspicion is immediately apparent 
about these local-global connections – between LSG and a foreign mining company.   
Unsurprisingly, paid-for protest was also visible. According to the accounts of some 
interviewees, there were instances when community support for anti-mining was mobilized 
through elite’s distribution of cash rewards in exchange for joining protests. These were 
partially linked to local elites, seeking personal gains through inciting community protests. 
“Local baymanaps [rich men] in Aral were initially opposed to mining. They did not want to 
lose access to cheap labor, because local people would have alternative employment 
opportunities at the mining site”, notes a specialist of civil society organization (CSO) (CSO 
Interview #1, October 2016). According to the accounts of the mining company in Aral, 
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certain brokers proposed to help with mobilizing public support in exchange for N amount 
of money (MC-A Interview #1, August 2016). The mining company representative further 
elaborated: 
We have declined the offer of certain individuals to facilitate questions on behalf of 
us with the community. This would have jeopardized our potential to gain 
community trust…We operated in a chaotic environment where we had to 
communicate privately with government officials if we wanted to work in this 
country and negotiate every step we needed to take after the issuance of a license 
(MC-A Interview #2, August 2016). 
This quotation indicates that public rules of issuing a license are accompanied by closed-
door processes between the company and the government. Such hidden transcripts are rarely 
visible in public but prevail over the formal laws. Again, TA are virtual, that is, derivative of 
substantive and complex political contestation. 
Multiple interviewees deployed the public transcript of a highly circumscribed, elite-
led and law-bound TA. A CSO representative stated: “the laws on environmental protection 
and licensing help to cut down corruption in the sector and make it rather difficult for the 
companies and government to foster their personal agenda…” (CSO Interview #2, October 
2016). One of the mining company representatives commented: “the government has set 
strict environmental regulations. In order not to be in trouble, we ensure our compliance 
with the set rules” (MC Interview #3, September 2016). Further logics of TA appropriated 
by the government include public meetings and development funds for what is officially 
denoted as “transparent sub-national revenue management”, and the command by elites for 
“frequent public meetings with local communities” (Interview with the State Committee 
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Representative #4, November 2015). A CSO representative acknowledged these 
government efforts to work more in a transparent and accountable manner and commented:  
In the aftermath of mining conflicts, government improved its performance related 
to transparency and accountability. Due to public disapproval of mining, it issued, in 
several instances, orders to stop the work of mining companies. They asked our help 
with printing and disseminating information about mining to local communities 
through our public reception centers (CSO Interview #3, November 2015). 
These public transcripts affirm the authority of patrons, which may be multiple and 
dispersed in any given setting. However, such public transcripts do not go unquestioned and 
are occasionally challenged by ‘hidden transcripts’ bursting into the public domain and 
demonstrating the agency of non-elites – an agency which is present but limited and latent in 
the public transcripts and events of TA. 
4. Establishing Networks 
The second strategy used by the community members at the research sites and to be 
discussed in this sub-section relates to establishing networks, often across an array of local, 
national and foreign actors. It was observed that community members in both Aral and 
Orlovka adopted this strategy to champion their interests and contest for TA in resource 
governance.  For these actors, TA were substantive in that at least one political goal was to 
increase the provision of information and to hold elites to account for their activities. 
In Aral, multiple small networks of community members were established based on 
uruu [line of descent] and kvartal [districts]. It was expected that networks would typically be 
established between elites and non-elites in neopatrimonial societies, fragmented along the 
lines of political and economic status of residents. Initial anti-mining networks were 
polarized within the village and mainly driven by local elites (former deputies of jergiliktuu 
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kenesh, school director, leaders of kvartal and uruu and aksakaldar sotu [court of elders]). In 
many instances, interviewees mentioned Chokoi uruu4 as leaders of resistance networks in 
the village, because their land was located close to the mining site. They were at risk of losing 
their income source due to potential impact of mining on their land and livestock. They 
sought alliances with women and youth councils5 to gain more public support for resistance.  
Similar to patrons, community activists in Aral fostered ‘ideology’ on an informal 
level to strengthen their political position. This ‘ideology’ distinguished networking of 
activists as el uchun [for people] and elge karshi [against people]. Those who did not support 
public demands were considered elge karshi and ‘spoilers of people’s unity’. The ‘ideology’ of 
el uchun signified the role of people in resource governance. “We thought that with claiming 
rights of people, we could attract other compatriots to join us and strengthen our position. 
We have been ignored for long by this corrupt government” – noted a village leader (AC 
Interview #7, March 2016). With devising this resistance to be about people, activists 
professed the ‘ideology’ of el uchun to expand their network and exert their agency.  
The networks reached as far as foreign mining companies and eventually involved 
non-elites in resource governance. Villagers found out that a mining company Talas Copper 
Gold (TCG) was given a license for exploration after two years since it had started working. 
They reached out to jergiliktuu kenesh to learn more about this, claiming their right to know 
about what was happening in their village. A deputy of jergiliktuu kenesh commented: “we 
contacted a local vendor company to get in touch with TCG and organize a public meeting” 
                                                        
4 Doolotkeldieva’s research (2015) also showed the role of Chokoi line of descent in anti-
mining resistance. 
5 Women and youth kenesh [council] were not institutionalized structures. A few activists 
formed loosely structured group, which could recruit other acquaintances and activate the 
affiliated group members when needed. In Aral, organization of trainings for women by 
Talas Copper Gold activated women kenesh, which later became a group and received 
funding to conduct some educational work with women in the village. 
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(AC Interview #5, July 2016). Several villagers shared that ayil okmotu [local executive 
government] had some form of established relations with a vendor company, which 
seemingly served as a communication link between them and the foreign mining company 
representatives in Bishkek. The villagers requested to meet in person with the company 
management and independent environment experts.  
We tried to establish ties with the representatives from Jogorku Kenesh [Parliament] 
and the National Academy of Science to seek support on a national level. Several of 
us went to Bishkek to meet Jogorku Kenesh deputies and state our concerns for starting 
mining without involving people in discussions. One of us knew a person from the 
National Academy of Science. We asked them to come to our village to conduct an 
independent environmental impact assessment (AC Interview #8, July 2016).  
Community activists engaged in relation building with actors in the capital to mobilize 
support for addressing TA from the livelihood dimension. Meanwhile, some well-off 
community members, mainly land and livestock owners, created their local networks to resist 
mining. These methods included spreading rumors about harmful impact of mining and 
manipulating public opinion through appealing to the sense of resource nationalism 
(“Kyrgyzstani people should use the land and its resources, instead of giving them to 
foreigners”).  
 In Orlovka, community members established personalized cross-class relations with 
jergiliktuu kenesh who had networking relations with a mining company. They used these 
networking relations to access political space where decisions were made. One youth activist 
noted:  
We knew that a few local deputies worked with the mining company representatives. 
We established closer relations with them. Our common goal was to work together 
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towards socially just and safe mining practices that contribute to economic 
development (OC Interview #9, August 2016).  
Unlike in Aral, youth activists in Orlovka initiated building one cross-class network6 (vs. 
multiple) with other youth in the neighboring villages, LSG and their acquaintances at the 
mining company. Since the choice of strategy depended on access to information (Smith 
1965), community members used their contacts at jergiliktuu kenesh and a mining company 
and their knowledge about how “political-bureaucratic labyrinth” worked to navigate 
through the system7 (see Tattersall 2013). Youth activists aptly utilized informal services of 
intermediaries (denoted as brokers in Doolot and Heathershaw 2015), which were often 
used by patrons to leverage local support, to connect to the system of governance and 
pursue their interests. These brokers were people who worked at the mining company and 
jergiliktuu kenesh and acquaintances of youth group at regional government structures such as 
finance and tax offices with knowledge about how the system worked. Accordingly, 
compared to Aral, youth activists were successful in building stronger networks ‘within’ and 
outside of Orlovka.  
Observations of the group meetings at a football field in Orlovka revealed that there 
were several youth patrons heading this network, including the key leader who was a lawyer 
and knowledgeable about legal governance processes. Relations within this group were more 
networked and mostly horizontal, especially when it came to generating ideas and 
strategizing actions. There was a power-sharing mechanism within the group. The youth 
leader commented: “we have divided responsibilities for leadership internally. Bolot [fictional 
                                                        
6 The importance of establishing networks that cut across tribal and clan identities were also 
highlighted in Radnitz’ (2010) study of the 2002 uprising in Aksy. 
7 This is referenced in the literature as a political strategy of peripheries (see Nuijten, 2003; 
Doolot & Heathersaw, 2015). 
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name] heads our youth non-governmental organization and works on enquiries of public 
related to mining, whereas I work with the LSG on transparency in budget allocation” (OC 
Interview #15, August 2016). This network included several young women who liaised with 
media. One of them shared:  
There was an article published about mining in Orlovka. It described youth activism 
as mob of protestors and framed our fight as meaningless. We knew that this article 
was ‘ordered’ by interested parties to discredit us. I invited then another media 
representative to come to Orlovka and capture the real story (OC Interview#11, 
August 2016).  
The quotation unveils new trends of networking in Orlovka, whereby the community 
partnered up with the media to scale up their ‘outreach’. While villagers in Aral rejected any 
interaction with the media, community members in Orlovka utilized it to popularize their 
agenda. Hence, Orlovka’s non-elite, activist networks showed signs of both a substantive 
popular conception of TA and political sophistication in their strategies to bring this about.   
5. Launching Social Mobilization 
The third strategy explored in case study communities is that of social mobilization. Villagers 
in Aral used public spaces such as culture house and schools to mobilize people and conduct 
public meetings about resource governance. An activist from Aral noted:  
We requested access to the mining site during the exploration stage, so that we were 
aware about what was being done. We discussed local employment terms with the 
mining company and required our involvement throughout mining processes (AC 
Interview #15, December 2015). 
The quotation reveals that villagers in Aral were able to ‘break into’ the space of power-
holders, who would typically decide how resources should be governed on their own. In this 
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example, TA are substantive goods pursued (successfully) by non-elites. However, they 
appear to be derivative of localism against the claims of elites. Another community member 
stated:  
Transparency and accountability are possible if government and companies listen to 
us. Why should it be just the government or company setting the rules? This is a land 
where we live, and we will join forces to manifest that it is our right to take part in 
deciding how this land will be used” (AC Interview #12, August 2016).  
Several interviews with participants of protests similarly indicated that by mobilizing against 
mining, they tried to change the decision-making chain – when government would issue a 
license and the mining company would start working without engaging with the community. 
Continuous protests in Aral led to TA-related achievements such as promotion of the right 
to participate in decision making.  
However, Aral’s political radicalization was subject to complex realities on the 
ground. One of the complexities was the involvement of security services or police officers 
in community contestations to seek their own benefits. In March and October 2011, villagers 
organized two major violent attacks at the exploration camp, demanding TCG to leave. 
Interviewees noted that leaders of protests were under surveillance. Several protest leaders 
shared:  
My phone conversations were recorded. I received several anonymous warnings over 
my phone to stop protests. When we were heading to meet with activists from 
another village, where protests started against mining, police stopped us on our way. 




Law enforcement agencies seemed to have some kind of relations with a mining 
company. The company provided support to local police to fix their building roof. 
How could this be interpreted? The mining company trying to get police to be their 
krisha8? Our underpaid police probably did not mind some backstage cash flow (AC 
Interview #14, October 2016). 
Surveillance of activists is a common mechanism in authoritarian states. Interactions of 
transnational mining companies with law enforcement agencies and security services in the 
extractive sector produce ‘hybrid’ practices of the coercive protection of mining operations 
via an internationalized indirect rule (see Honke 2013).  
Considering the quotations above, elite practices in Aral may be interpreted in three 
ways: (1) police structures ‘extracting’ resources (e.g. cash or infrastructure support) from 
mining companies; (2) mining companies willingly supporting police to serve as a 
‘protectorate’ of its mining operations; and (3) the state discharging its responsibilities of 
governance to a mining company and launching surveillance against protestors. Villagers 
noted the keen involvement of local and regional police structures in monitoring the mining 
situation in Aral. “Regional police would rarely pay attention to the issues that we bring to 
their attention. With the start of mining, they were overly eager to visit us at no occasion” 
(AC Interview #11, November 2016)9. However, continuous anti-mining contestations by 
non-elites, sometimes with substantive claims for TA, changed power-holders’ ‘business as 
usual’ approach to resource governance. As one of the civil society experts noted, 
                                                        
8 Patron/protector 
9 By the same token, Doolotkeldieva’s (2015) research in Aral found that police and security 
services did not prevent attacks from happening, but they “became very active in-between 
these episodes” (187). According to the activists, “local police and security officers exploited 
citizens’ resistance as an opportunity to extort money from the company and hence turn a 
blind eye to citizens’ complaints” (Doolotkeldieva 2015, 187). 
 
 22 
“government and company had to stop any mining-related activities and come to the village 
several times to negotiate with protestors” (CSO Interview #4, December 2015). This 
demonstrates the emergence of non-elite agency with potential to transform practices 
towards transparent and accountable resource governance.  
In Orlovka, social mobilization for TA was more substantive. Community members 
employed social mobilization strategy to stage protests as informal means of addressing local 
community interests and engaging in TA-related processes. Several protests took place due 
to various reasons in Orlovka. Residents considered the October 2012 protests to be of a 
bigger scale and significance, partially due to the effect it had on stopping the mining 
company’s work at site for a fixed period of time – until negotiations were reached with 
locals. Community members had different reasons to join the protest and their demands 
included: employment of local residents, environmental protection, deserving salaries for 
miners and better working conditions at the mining site. One of the youth activists said: “we 
have a group of youth leaders in Orlovka and neighboring villages, who are informal rulers 
of the area. We called our guys to join our protest against Altynken [mining company] to 
demand employment for locals (OC Interview # 2, July 2016). Here, generalized local 
grievances appear to have led to substantive TA claims.  
Community members learned10 from other examples of successful mobilization how 
to stage protests and (re)negotiate the informal terms of a contract. One of the youth 
activists commented: “we found out that a community in the South succeeded in 
renegotiating the terms with a mining company after their protests. We applied the same 
approach” (OC Interview #6, July 2016). Activists noted that they wanted to create effekt tolpi 
                                                        
10  Constructivists note that learning might have construction effects on identities and 
interests. The symbolic interactionists, guided by the work of George Herbert Mead, would 
also state that identities and interests are learned in social interaction (see Wendt, 1992, 326). 
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[crowd effect] through social mobilization in order to ensure that the government and 
mining company would address their concerns (OC Interviews #10, 12, July 2016). Such 
learned norms of cooperation evolved independently from the state (McGlinchey 2009) 
within and across communities, which have implications for approaching TA as a 
mobilization as well as cooperation mechanism. 
In addition to achieving impersonal goals (e.g. employment opportunities for the 
local population as a whole), several youth leaders in Orlovka used TA-related arguments to 
win local elections. Having come to power, these youth leaders challenged patron-client 
linkages and sought accountability of the Mayor’s Office. Youth local council deputies 
stated:  
There are several of us who joined the LSG with no political experience. We are 
outsiders in the system, and we can therefore question actions of other deputies.” 
(OC Interview #8).  
 
In one of the sessions, we blocked the decision of the Mayor’s Office, because it 
would have approved the company’s performance without holding a public hearing 
and discussing the case (OC Interview #2, July 2016).  
 
As noted by other interviewees, the youth leaders, who became a part of formal power, used 
their affiliation with the LSG to pursue their own (private) interests. Local government and 
community members referred to them as “a group of young people slowly changing the 
system to make it more accountable”, but also as “youth taking care of the community need 
as well as their own” (OC Interview #1, LSG Interview #2, July 2016). The latter is 
interpreted as a sign of political rationality in a political game, since all players desire power 
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as “a necessary condition for satisfying their goals” (Conn et al. 1973, 236). The instance of 
Orlovka showed that the youth group exercised agency, which in parallel led to reproduced 
neopatrimonial logic – with the use of formal and informal rules to pursue public and private 
gains (Ismailbekova 2017).    
In both case studies, the TA logic was brought into use by community members for 
pragmatic reasons, but on an ad-hoc basis (see Sklansky 2012; Stier 2004)11. Their use of 
strategies fostered practices that deployed TA both as a rationale to remove the authorities 
and take power (in Orlovka) and limit the power of the authorities and mining companies (in 
Aral) to sustain local livelihoods.   
6. Rethinking Transparency and Accountability 
The fieldwork data illustrates that in the TA domain, the interactions of actors were more 
multi-purposive than solely tied to more transparent and accountable resource governance. 
In Orlovka, community members employed the networking strategy to advance ideas of the 
public good such as social justice and local livelihood improvement while also pursuing 
private interests. But their participation in institutions of resource governance through social 
mobilization (led by youth patrons) also suggested cooptation and a neopatrimonial political 
strategy. In Aral, multiple networks linking elites and non-elites, and internal divisions based 
on uruu and kvartal within these networks, generated apparent TA momentum instrumentally 
(Wilson 2005). And yet even here, new public practices of protesting for community rights 
and direct engagement in negotiations with the mining company should be noted. The 
context of neopatrimonialism and institutional uncertainties shaped the exercise of non-elite 
agency and their TA pursuit in both communities but in different ways. It is the purpose of 
                                                        
11 Communities’ utilization of strategies to resist power-holders and exert their agency to 




this final section not to determine what causes this variation but to demonstrate the 
significance of non-elite agency by showing how the differential strategies of these actors 
correlate with the differential political processes in each case. 
 Examining the workings of TA requires scrutinizing strategies used by elite and non-
elite actors to take actions. Daily actions create power (see Checkel, 1998) and strategies 
shape those daily practices (Saurugger 2013). Analyzing strategies used at research sites 
showed how TA were enacted through contested and relational processes, guided by 
public/private interests and political-economic opportunities. Based on our analysis, Orlovka 
was a site where networked actor interactions and social mobilization for TA were part of a 
non-elite strategy to seize power (i.e. instrumental practice of TA). Aral was a site where TA-
related claims were more ad hoc but framed more radically as ‘with the people’ (i.e. 
substantive ‘ideology’ of TA).  
Non-elites’ use of (political game) strategies indicated that TA in the context of 
neopatrimonial settings emerged at the intersection of public and private interests and as a 
bottom-up process that could shift political boundaries. The non-elite use of social 
mobilization strategies fostered such meanings of TA as direct engagement and right to 
know, which contributed to leveraging more immediate and comprehensive control over 
political elites (Offe 1985, 817). Relatively recent community protests in other parts of 
Kyrgyzstan also demonstrate non-elites becoming more autonomous from elites in their 
claims for transparent and accountable resource governance. For instance, three hundred 
villagers in Solton Sary in August 201912, hundreds of protesting residents in Kazarman and 
Maidan in 2017 and 2018 and protests against uranium in April 2019 forced the government 
to stop the work of mining companies (Abdildaev 2019; Pannier 2019; MINEX Forum, 
                                                        
12 Protests in Solton Sary also took place in 2011 and 2015.  
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2019; Kaktus Media 2019; Madanbekov 2019; Djanibekova, 2018). In Solton Sary, the high 
death rate of livestock, a contaminated environment and a fight between locals and Chinese 
workers contributed to the escalation of protests. Villagers created Facebook pages “Naryn 
eli Solton-Sari uchun!!!” [people of Naryn for Solton-Sari] and “Kitaydin baskinchiligina 
karshibiz” [Against Chinese invasion] and posted pictures of dead sheep and videos of 
explosions at the mining site (Kaktus Media, 2019). In the latter example, public mistrust in 
companies’ compliance with TA, especially related to the environment, prominently shapes 
resistance to Chinese mining companies as well as to the government. This also raises the 
issue of “resource localism”, which goes beyond TA, but what is of relevance here is the 
relation between resource localism and weak governance. Together these foster detrimental 
political processes including environmental exploitation and pollution, isolation of local 
community and socio-economic disparities between elites and non-elites. Weak governance 
is unable to mitigate the rise of resource localism and generates public distrust to 
government and foreign mining companies.  
The failure of the government to obtain local consent and conduct reliable 
environmental impact assessments prior to approving mining companies’ work increases the 
role of ordinary citizens to seek TA through alternative ways. Media outlets report:  
The mine has been licensed without locals’ consent and the government has not kept 
the company accountable for practicing eco-friendly methods of mining within the 
Kyrgyz law (MINEX Forum 2019, para 5).  
 
We are not at fault here, but at the national level they are saying that an investor has 
come and that we are against him. We will welcome any investor with open arms if 
they are proposing something safe and environmentally sound that will provide 
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people with work – says a former worker of Makmalzoloto gold smelting plant, 
protesting in Kazarman (Djanibekova 2018, para 3) 
 
Further, massive protests in Issyk-Kul and Bishkek in April 2019 were combined with 
collecting signatures on petition to halt uranium mining at Kyzyl-Ompol. In six days, 
activists collected 30,000 signatures, which led to immediate government response in favor 
of ceasing uranium mining (Pannier 2019). These cases constitute a few examples that 
illustrate the importance of political processes led by non-elites, echoed through mass media 
and social media, in TA contestations.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the use of political game strategies, especially in 
selected case studies, resembled the logic of neopatrimonialism. This raises a number of 
questions: are TA practices epiphenomenal of neopatrimonialism and how are TA practices 
reworked in the case study communities? On the one hand, both instrumental and 
substantive TA practices are epiphenomenal of neopatrimonial politics when they are 
derivative of the political game strategies used by elites and non-elites to pursue their 
(private) interests. Economic and political gains are at the center of neopatrimonial politics 
and usually achieved through extended networks of acquaintance and personalized rewards 
and punishments (Hale 2014). The community case studies demonstrated that these 
strategies helped them achieve short-term interests within the logic of neopatrimonial 
politics. For instance, local elites/patrons in Aral initiated public discussions about benefit 
sharing and environmental violations, using this social base for “subversive clientelism” 
against national elites (see Radnitz 2010) or to reorder local hierarchies. The report of Zoi 
Environment Network (2012) on Kyrgyzstan states: “groups of wealthy individuals have 
organized protests in several villages to incite resistance to mining as a way of protecting 
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their status quo” (35). Other studies have shown how the local rural elite in Central Asia 
plays a role in changing political and economic order at peripheries (see Reeves 2014). 
Protests at mining sites may not represent fully true grassroots aspirations13; they could be a 
“weapon of the wealthy” (i.e. local/national elites) to pursue their own interests such as 
winning (local) elections and/or protecting themselves from a predatory state (Radnitz 
2010). These accounts suggest that protests at mining sites should be carefully analyzed for 
they enable different elite factions as well as creating opportunities for non-elite agency; the 
subversive clientelism of rural elites is a part of the political game but it is not indicative of 
non-elite agency.  
Nevertheless, the fieldwork data showed that TA were also substantively deployed 
partly as a reflection of the neopatrimonial context and partly in opposition to the 
established discourses and hierarchies of that context. The findings from the cases suggest 
that TA were remade in practice through actors’ appropriation of strategies with the 
neopatrimonial logic14. The empirical case studies illustrated that community members used 
strategies to minimize drawbacks of vulnerability to the interests of a particular patron or 
transnational patronage network. Patronage, while associated with negative connotations, 
should not be automatically considered as counter-productive to TA efforts, or democracy, 
in Kyrgyzstan (Ismailbekova 2017). Some scholars argue that patronage itself entails norms 
of political accountability, responsibility and legitimacy (Van Gool and Bekkers 2012, 6). 
Accountability relations could be extended from small political elite to full-fledged clientelist 
systems (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The case of Orlovka demonstrated transparent 
                                                        
13  Doolotkeldieva (2015) adds that natural resources in Kyrgyzstan became “a residual 
category of elite struggle and manipulation” (177) 
14 Citizens “rework familiar patronage models and largely appropriate, rather than reject, 
neopatrimonial politics” (Van Gool and Bekkers 2012, 5). 
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and accountable behavior of a young and upcoming patron Almaz (fictional name): after 
becoming a local council deputy, he continued his direct and open engagement with youth. 
As observed during the fieldwork, Almaz conducted informal gatherings with young people 
at the football field to share some of the insights related to governance processes and 
exchange opinions with the fellow men. These open meetings were part of the process that 
produced the neopatrimonial power of Almaz, and they served as the necessary pre-
condition for enforcing his patronage. As such, non-elites had their own interest in adhering 
to (selective) TA norms: it was a means to become an elite. In Aral, increased competition 
among local elites blocked new entrants like Almaz.  
Research outside of the post-Soviet region also suggests that TA are more likely to 
be found substantively in neopatrimonial polities which, like Kyrgyzstan, are not 
consolidated autocracies. The experience of rural grassroots movements in Mexico and India 
demonstrates that political opening or instability is conducive to the emergence of TA (see 
Fox 2007). In India, public contestations lowered substantially barriers for participation and 
enhanced citizens’ access to the “benefits of democracy” (Tummala 2009, 57). Indigenous 
movements in Peru related to “rights to nature” emerged with democratization and 
neoliberalization along with political interests concealed behind indigenous movements 
(Greene 2006). In Australia, indigenous communities were able to legitimize their power 
through using physical actions and tactics that would delay mining activities and mobilizing 
support (Trebeck 2007). As the research on collective action shows, actors often use 
informal structures to come together, especially in the absence of the central actors (Ostrom 
1998; Ostrom et al. 1994).  Kyrgyzstan is such a context where the central state is weak. 
According to the accounts of interviewees, in order not to create instability and avoid 
disturbing mining operations in Orlovka, the government with community leaders found 
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ways to address the company’s violations of rules during their closed-door meeting with the 
mining company. This signals that informal mechanisms such as closed-door negotiations 
could be used not only for private deals, but also to ensure compliance of the mining 
company to TA norms.  
Conclusion 
This article challenged the elite-centered narrative on resource governance in post-Soviet 
Central Asia, generally, and Kyrgyzstan, specifically. It discussed engagement of ordinary 
citizens in TA-related contestations in rural communities. The article revealed that 
community members at mining sites engaged in TA contestations, because (a) substantively, 
they perceived land and its resources to belong to people and (b) instrumentally, they could 
benefit from possible changes that the TA-related contestations might bring. While the 
former reason indicates constitutive power of discourse and notions of belonging/owning 
these resources, the latter shows rationality and search for shared public and/or private 
gains. Furthermore, the findings indicate that some community members may have followed 
the lead or logic of elites/patrons, but others engaged in (and even manipulated) the political 
game through appropriating TA for common goals. Communities acknowledged patrons’ 
authority, networked with them, and protested against them to exert their agency. 
The cross-case analysis stipulated that at best, TA would emerge as the result of 
political openings at the intersection of public and private interests, and at worst, they would 
be epiphenomenal of neopatrimonial politics. However, importantly, the study revealed non-
elite agency at both these extremes and the variations in between. The instances of non-
elites’ involvement in political games signifies that we need to pay closer attention to them in 
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